Changes, if any, to redefine Indian
foreign policy must not take place in an episodic manner, or as a series of
isolated steps
The BRICS-BIMSTEC meeting in Goa this
month, that immediately followed the annual India-Russia Summit (also in Goa),
capped months of hectic diplomatic activity, during which India pursued a
robust, even aggressive, foreign policy. By and large, such activism has served
India well — the most evident being the furthering of relations between India
and the United States. Given the several changes in direction — and departures
from past policies and practices — taking place, there is perhaps scope to
debate whether this amounts to a redefining of India’s foreign policy.
International diplomacy is hardly a
‘zero-sum game’. It has become even more complicated with the passage of time.
Hence, giving a new direction to the country’s foreign policy demands careful consideration
and assessment of all relevant aspects. Systemic, national and decision-making
factors must determine foreign policy choices. Maintaining coherence and
balance is also a vital aspect. It would seem, however, that this kind of
exercise has yet to be undertaken, even as shifts in policy have been effected.
Among the acronyms
One indication of this would seem to
be India’s current approach towards different multilateral organisations and
plurilateral groupings. Many are better known by their acronyms such as NAM,
SAARC, BRICS, BIMSTEC, etc. Multilateral fora have today become indispensable
to the conduct of international diplomacy, and how a nation deals with, or
adjusts to, the alphabetic soup of organisations that exist is important. This
is so even if a case exists that some of the older ones have lost much of their
relevance.
Since Independence, India has played
a leading role in multilateral fora. It was a founder member of NAM (Non
Aligned Movement), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation),
BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and BCIM
(Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar). India has sought membership of the NSG
(Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies) and also full membership
of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation), etc, recognising the potential of being inside
rather than outside such bodies. Even granting that the world is increasingly
tilting towards the post-modern phenomenon of transactional politics, and that
older institutions such as NAM are increasingly out of sync with this, a proper
study of the utility of participation in such fora — prior to treating many of
them as of little consequence — would have been useful. To optimise its many
advantages, India clearly needs to play on as many geopolitical chessboards as
possible.
NAM may be a pale shadow of what it
was during an earlier period when towering personalities such as Nehru, Tito,
Nasser and Castro dominated its proceedings. With non-alignment giving way to
strategic alignment, organisations such as NAM may seem anachronistic, but it
should not be lost sight of that it still resonates with many Third World
countries. It also offers an alternative platform for putting forward a
different viewpoint. It would, hence, be premature to pronounce the death of
NAM. The Indian Prime Minister’s decision to skip the NAM Summit in Venezuela
may well hasten its end, but does not take away from the fact that NAM still
has some relevance and India could still utilise NAM — perhaps less ideological
but more purposive than in the past — to counter newer challenges such as
China’s not so ‘peaceful rise’.
SAARC is still relevant
India’s stakes in SAARC are, if
anything, higher. It is the most important country in South Asia, and India was
the progenitor of the idea of a primarily economic grouping of countries of
South Asia. Admittedly, SAARC has been on ‘life-support’ for much of the
period, but had begun to display a new vigour and dynamism of late. India had
also shown a willingness to adopt an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal approach
towards other SAARC members which had gone down well with these countries. To
undermine SAARC due to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan may well
be an instance of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’.
Propping up bodies such as BIMSTEC
and BCIM in place of SAARC is hardly the answer, and could even prove
counterproductive. The China factor is all too predominant here, with almost
every country (other than India) under China’s thrall, having been assiduously
wooed with financial and other inducements. China is hoping to further
consolidate its position through its One Belt, One Road initiative which has
been warmly welcomed by all these countries, the sole exception again being
India.
In the case of BRICS, the weakening
of the so-called strategic triangle between Russia, China and India does affect
its image. The diminishing economic fortunes of Russia, Brazil and South
Africa, of late, have also dented its image as a flag-bearer of newly emerging
economies. Still, the idea of BRICS remains valid though it will require hard
work and skilful diplomacy to reproduce the previous elan, and avert a pincer
move against India by Russia and China as they move closer strategically and
economically.
Changing ties
Undoubtedly, India’s foreign policy
has to evolve in keeping with the changes and shifts taking place across the
globe. Permanence in relations, and consistency in alignments, is not a signal
virtue in the world of the 21st century. Not all relationships can or should be
regarded as cast in stone, and impervious to change. This applies equally to
ideologies. Nevertheless changes, if any, must not take place in an episodic
manner, or as a series of isolated steps.
For instance, India-U.S. relations
today are at an all-time high. This was hardly the case a decade and a half
ago. On the other hand, the ‘all weather’ India-Russia relationship is today
nowhere at the same level as it was even a few years back. Notwithstanding the
rhetoric from Goa, Russia can hardly be viewed as a strategic ally as of now.
Russia may have been restored to the position of ‘the most favoured defence
supplier’, but this is a far cry from being a strategic ally. India may be only
partly to blame for this, as Russia has been looking at diversifying its
options for some time. It had moved closer to China and has achieved a degree
of strategic congruence to counter U.S. moves in Asia.
The China, Russia and India triangle
thus heralds a situation where two sides, China and Russia, have grown much
closer to each other, with India in danger of losing out in this process. The
China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination, as also the
recent Russia-Pakistan military exercises, even though on a limited scale and a
subtext of this, only demonstrate the growing strategic ambiguity in our
neighbourhood and in Asia as a whole.
On the sidelines of the March
It is China that will demand India’s
wholehearted attention. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent reference to a
‘new Long March’ is not without significance. China’s ‘not so peaceful rise’,
alongside its growing economic and military muscle, its growing strategic
congruence with Russia, and a further tightening of its links with Pakistan
pose a pre-eminent challenge for India in the competition of influence in the
region and beyond. It may have other graver implications as well. The One Belt,
One Road initiative and the new Maritime Silk Route/Road also have the
potential to bottle up India and Indian initiatives in Asia.
As India aspires to become a leading
power, these are real matters for contemplation and action. It would be a
mistake if India were to fritter away its energies by viewing regional and
world developments through a very narrow prism, viz., terrorism. There are far
bigger and larger issues at stake that demand attention. Most important would
be highlighting India’s capabilities to accelerate economic growth during a
period which marks the demise of globalisation. India could also bring to the
attention of the rest of the world its tremendous ‘human assets’ that can power
the country as the world transits to an incredible future, viz., the era of the
Fourth Industrial Revolution.
M.K. Narayanan is a former National
Security Adviser and former Governor of West Bengal.
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